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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the op-
portunity of legal restrictions on it. An electoral race is modeled as a
signalling game with three classes of players: a continuum of voters,
two candidates, and one interest group. The group has non-veri¯able
insider information on the candidates' valence and, on the basis of this
information, o®ers a contribution to each candidate in exchange for a
favorable policy position. Candidates spend the contributions they re-
ceive on non-directly informative advertising. This paper shows that:
(1) A separating equilibrium exists in which the group contributes to
a candidate only if the insider information about that candidate is
positive; (2) Although voters are fully rational, a ban on campaign
advertising can be welfare-improving; and (3) Split contributions may
arise in equilibrium (and should be prohibited).
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In electoral competitions throughout the world campaign advertising is be-
coming more and more common.1 In the last US Senate election the aver-
age candidate made campaign expenditures of $4.5 million. The need for
new forms of regulation is widely felt. In the US Senate and House com-
bined, more than 80 bills have been introduced to reform campaign ¯nance.
Notwithstanding the interest that surrounds the issue, we still lack a wel-
fare analysis of campaign advertising that can form the basis for discussing
alternative forms of regulation.
Three stylized facts are observed in campaign advertising:
² It Is Paid for by Groups whose Objectives Di®er from the Median
Voter's Objectives. Campaign contributions come from groups of vot-
ers whose preferences are often at odd with the preferences of the
majority of voters.2 For instance, in the US, agricultural interest
groups are habitual donors. Their preferred policies { agricultural
subsidies and other forms of protection to farmers { cause well docu-
mented welfare losses. Lopez and Pagoulatos [22] conduct a study on
trade barriers in the US food and tobacco industry. They ¯nd that
welfare losses can be up to 12.50% of domestic consumption and are
positively associated with campaign contributions from agricultural
interest groups.
² It Does Not Convey Hard Information. Casual observation suggests
that campaign advertising contains little direct information. Political
ads are not credible. In the US, the First Amendment protects cam-
paign advertising as free speech. Voters have no legal recourse against
a candidate who broadcasts ads with misleading statements or mis-
representation of reality (such a strong protection does not apply to
commercial advertising).
² It Works. Despite the ¯rst two facts, campaign advertising is e®ective.
Ansolabehere and Iyengar [1] have conducted a laboratory experiment
with more than 3000 residents of the Los Angeles area. Their goal was
1For a recent cross-country survey of campaign spending and campaign regulation, see
The Economist [9].
2A survey of campaign giving patterns can be found in Lehman Schlozman and Tier-
ney [19, Chapter 10]
1to study how political advertising on mass media a®ects the voters' de-
cisions. The experimenters produced several versions of thirty-second
TV ads, showed them to the subjects, and then asked the subjects to
¯ll a questionnaire. Subjects who viewed an ad from a candidate were
much more likely to vote for that candidate (exposure to a single ad
increased the candidate's share of the vote by 5%). Notice that the
ads contained so little hard information that they could apply to a
candidate as well as to her opponent (the ads were produced in two
versions that di®ered solely in the name of the sponsoring candidate).
A theory of campaign advertising should explain the three stylized facts
above. The literature has so far used two types of models of advertising:
directly informative advertising and persuasive advertising. A model of the
¯rst type has been developed by Austen-Smith [3]. However, as we have
argued above, direct information transmission does not seem to be the main
component of advertising. Models of the second type are widely used.3
They assume a fraction of electors cast their vote according to an advertising
in°uence function. This function is a mapping from advertising expenditures
made by candidates into vote shares. These models can explain the three
stylized facts above. The second and the third fact are assumed. The ¯rst
fact can occur in equilibrium because a fraction of voters do not realize
that a candidate who spends a lot on advertising is a candidate who has
promised a lot to interest groups. Those voters { it must be concluded { are
irrational.4
Although they explain observed patterns, models of the second type are
not micro-founded. The advertising in°uence function is not derived from
primitive assumptions on the preferences of voters. This is a drawback
because those models cannot be used to make welfare comparisons. If our
goal is to evaluate proposed regulation, we need a micro-founded model.56
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a general
3See, among others, Baron [5, 6], Morton and Cameron [26], and Grossman and Help-
man [15, 14]
4This point is made in La®ont and Tirole [18, p. 634].
5Indeed, the need for a micro-founded model of campaign advertising is perceived in
the ¯eld. See Morton and Cameron [26, p. 85], Baron [6, p. 45], and the above cited
La®ont and Tirole.
6Of course, one could construct a micro-founded model of persuasive advertising. This
has been done for commercial advertising by Dixit and Norman [8]. However, as Fisher
and McGowan [11] point out, a model of advertising in which preferences are endogenous
does not lend itself to general welfare comparisons.
2model of campaign advertising in which voters are fully rational and adver-
tising is not directly informative. The crucial assumption is that interest
groups observe insider information about candidates. We show that this
model explains the three stylized facts above. Thus, the advertising in°u-
ence function commonly used in the literature can be seen as a reduced
form of our model. Second, and more importantly, we use the model to
make welfare comparisons. In particular, we evaluate the opportunity of
banning campaign advertising or split contributions.
An electoral race is modeled as a signaling game with three classes of
players: a continuum of voters, one interest group, and two candidates.
Voters judge candidates on two dimensions: valence (e.g. ability, leadership,
integrity) and policy. All voters agree on the valence dimension, but have
heterogeneous preferences about policy. The interest group caters to the
policy dimension of a subset of voters, but is not directly interested in the
valence of candidates. The ideal policy of the median group member di®ers
from the ideal policy of the median voter. Candidates maximize their chance
of being elected.
The valence of a candidate is unknown, but there are imperfect sig-
nals about it. Some of these signals are public (candidates' records, TV
debates, etc.) and some are observed by the interest group but not by
voters (rumours, ¯rst-hand experience, etc.). The insider signals are non-
veri¯able. After observing the insider signals, the group makes an o®er to
each candidate. The o®er consists of a monetary contribution to be spent
on non-directly informative advertising and a policy to be implemented if
the candidate is elected. Candidates accept or reject the group's o®er. Each
voter then observes the public signals, the policy choice, and the amount
spent on advertising by each of the two candidates and casts a vote for one
of the two candidates.
One may conjecture that in this model a ban on advertising cannot be
optimal.7 Each candidate maximizes her chance of being elected. Thus, she
will accept a contribution only if it increases her chance of being perceived
in a positive way by voters. Voters observe policy positions. Thus, they
see any promise that a candidate makes to the interest group and they can
punish a candidate who promises too much by not electing her. Therefore,
if advertising occurs in equilibrium, one might conclude that voters must
get more bene¯t in terms of indirect information than they give up in terms
7Throughout this paper a ban on advertising and a ban on contributions produce the
same e®ects. Thus we only refer to a ban on advertising. See Section 6 for a discussion.
3of policies. As is turns out, this conjecture is incorrect.
The main results of the model are:
1. There exists a separating equilibrium in which the interest group con-
tributes to a candidate if and only if the insider signal about that can-
didate is positive. A pooling equilibrium exists but does not survive the
Intuitive Criterion. The insider signal is revealed to voters through the
amount of campaign advertising. In exchange for a contribution, the
group obtains from the candidate a policy position that is favorable to
the group and detrimental to the median voter. Intuitively, the group
sees contributions as an investments with stochastic return: the group
gets the favorable policy only if the candidate is elected. Therefore,
the group prefers to contribute to a likely winner and uses the insider
signal to infer the chances of the candidate's victory. A group with a
good insider signal can a®ord a contribution that a group with a bad
insider signal cannot a®ord.
2. Under certain conditions, a ban on campaign advertising strictly in-
creases the voters' welfare (which includes the group members' wel-
fare). Campaign contributions represent a credible threat the inter-
est group can use against a good candidate (i.e. a candidate with
a positive insider signal): in equilibrium a good candidate who re-
jects the group's o®er is perceived by voters as bad. Through this
implicit threat, the group can obtain from a good candidate a policy
position that makes the median voter indi®erent between a good can-
didate with that policy position and a bad candidate with the median
voter's ideal position. This represents the candidate's participation
constraint. If the ideal policy of the median group member is distant
from the ideal policy of the median voter, the group wants the partic-
ipation constraint to be binding. In equilibrium, it is as if voters only
encountered bad candidates with the median voter's ideal position.
The presence of campaign advertising brings the median voter more
cost in terms of biased policy than bene¯t in terms of information on
candidate valence.
3. If the group receives equally good insider signals about the two can-
didates, it will contribute to both and will get favorable policies from
both. If one candidate rejects the o®er, he will be perceived as bad
and the other candidate will be perceived as good. This situation is
particularly negative for voters: they receive useless information and
4they have to choose between two candidates who cater to the interest
group. Indeed, it is proven that a ban on split contributions always
increases the voters' welfare.
The problem is formulated in a generalway. Inparticular, the probability
distributions of signals are left ina generic form. Moreover, results are shown
to be robust to modi¯cations of the model such as the assumption that
candidates make o®ers to the group or the assumption that policy positions
are unobserved. However, results change dramatically if candidates do not
receive contributions from groups but they ¯nance campaigns out of their
personal wealth. In that case a separating equilibrium need not exist.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Then, for illustrative purposes, the core of the paper is divided into two
main parts. Section 3 assumes that the interest group can only contribute
to Candidate 1. With this restriction it is possible to prove results (1)
and (2) in an intuitive way. However, the assumption that the groups can
only contribute to a pre-speci¯ed candidate is unrealistic. Thus, Section 4
develops the full model in whichthe group cancontribute to bothcandidates.
Results (1) and (2) still hold, and, moreover, result (3) is proven. Section 5
discusses modi¯cations of the model. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature This paper is inspired by two strands of literature
that are somewhat distant from each other: the political economy literature
on campaign contributions and the industrial organization literature on ad-
vertising with rational consumers. In common with the ¯rst strand (See
Morton and Cameron [26] for a survey), we model an electoral race as a
game with three classes of players: voters, candidates, and interest groups.
We adopt most of the de¯nitions and the assumptions that are standard in
the literature on campaign contributions, with three important di®erences:
(1) all voters are rational; (2) candidates are judged on valence as well as
policy; and (3) some non-veri¯able signals about valence are only available
to insiders. The second strandincludes Milgrom and Roberts [25], Kihlstrom
and Riordan [17], Hertzendorf [16], and Bagwell and Ramey [4], and others.
In common with the second strand we assume that what matters in adver-
tising is the amount spent on it, not its content. Under certain conditions,
an agent with non-veri¯able private information is able to reveal it through
non-directly informative costly signalling. However, models of commercial
advertising rely on concepts { such as quantity, price, and cost { that do
not ¯nd a parallel in elections. Thus, while the spirit is similar, our model
5is di®erent from commercial advertising models.
Two other papers study models in which campaign advertising is non-
directly informative
In Potters, Sloof, and Van Winden [27], a candidate can be of a high
type or a low type. Both types bene¯t from being elected, but the high
type bene¯ts more (or ¯nds advertising less expensive). Thus, the authors'
rationale for campaign advertising is that good candidates have more to
gain than bad candidates from being perceived as good. On the contrary,
we take the agnostic viewpoint that candidates of di®erent types bene¯t
equally from election and face the same cost of advertising.
Gerber [12] argues that campaign advertising conveys information be-
cause it reveals the insider signals of groups. Thus, the rationale is similar
to our model. However, in the separating equilibrium described by Gerber,
both a group with a good candidate and a group with a bad candidate are
indi®erent between contributing or not contributing (we discuss this prob-
lem in Subsection 3.2.1). Thus, a separating equilibrium exists only when
exogenous reasons guarantee that groups with good candidates contribute
and groups with bad candidates do not. On the contrary, in our separating
equilibrium a group with a good candidate has a strictly higher incentive to
contribute than a group with a bad candidate.
Two recent papers do not tackle campaign advertising but are closely
related to the present work. Grossman and Helpman [13] study political
endorsements with rational voters.8 Lohmann [21] analyzes a model of ret-
rospective voting in which a minority of voters is (endogenously) better
informed than the majority. Both these two papers and the present paper
show that in equilibrium candidates choose policy positions that are biased
away from the median voter. This policy bias occurs despite the fact that
voters can, at least partially, observe policy positions. The reason is that
a minority of voters enjoy an informational advantage and use it to extract
rent from candidates in the form of favorable policies. These models are in
line with the emphasis that observers of interest groups politics put on the
monitoring role of groups.
8In the present work, cheap-talk endorsements are never credible. This is because the
insider signal is on valence and the group derives no direct utility from valence.
62 Model
2.1 Political Dimensions and Voters
A continuum of voters indexed with i 2 I must elect one of two candidates,
indexed with j 2 f1;2g. The possibility of abstension is disregarded.
Each candidate is represented along two dimensions: his policy position
pj 2 < and his valence µj 2 £ ½ <. The policy dimension can be inter-
preted both as ideological view (position on the left-right line) or as policy
stance (e.g. position on the issue of subsidies to milk producers). The va-
lence dimension captures a set of characteristics of the candidate that are
unambiguously good for voters.
Voter i is described by his preferred policy pi, which is strictly increasing
in i. Let e 2 f1;2g denote the candidate who wins the election. The utility
function of Voter i is
ui(µe;pe) = µe ¡u(pi ¡pe)
where u(¢) is continuous, symmetric, and strictly increasing in jpi ¡ pej. If
Voter i knew µ1 and µ2, he would vote for candidate 1 if and only if
µ1 ¡ µ2 ¸ u(pi ¡ p1) ¡ u(pi ¡ p2) ¸ 0
Thus, if the two candidates have identical policy positions, Candidate 1 is
elected if and only if he beats Candidate 2 on the valence dimension.
2.2 Information
Voters observe policy positions p1 and p2 perfectly.9 However, they cannot
observe valences µ1 and µ2 directly. µ1 and µ2 are independent random
variables, each of which has prior distribution Á(¢) de¯ned on £. Priors are
common knowledge.
Three signals about the valence of Candidate j 2 f1;2g are received
sequentially. First, all agents (voters, candidates, group) observe a public
signal xj 2 X ½ <, which represents the candidates' historical record (for
instance, it may capture the well-documented incumbency advantage). Sec-
ond, only interest groups observe an insider signal yj 2 Y ½ < which can
9Section 5.1 will show that results do not change dramatically if voters cannot observe
the policy dimension because, in equilibrium, they can infer it perfectly.
7be thought of as impressions, word-of-mouth, unproven allegations, etc.10
The insider signal is non-veri¯able. Third, all agents observe a public signal
zj 2 Z ½ < that derives from the candidate's performance during the cam-
paign (e.g. pre-electoral TV debates). More complex signal sequences could
be accomodated. The results of this paper depend uniquely on the assump-
tion that the last public signal is received after the ¯rst insider signal.11
The cumulative distributions of xj, yj, and zj given µj are, respectively,
Fx(xjjµj), Fy(yjjµj), and Fz(zjjµj). Fx(xjjµj) is strictly increasing in xj for
any µj 2 £, and similarly for Fy and Fz. The random variables x1, y1,
and z1 are assumed to be stochastically independent from x2, y2, and z2.
Furthermore,
Assumption 1 For j = 1;2, xj, yj, and zj are mutually independent given
µj and satisfy the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP).12
The assumption implies that an increase in any of the three signals trans-
lates in an increase in the expected value of the valence.
Let
^ µ(xj;yj;zj) = E(µjjxj;yj;zj)
and
· µ(xj;zj) = E(µjjxj;zj)
^ µ is the expected value of µj given the public signals and the insider signal,
while · µ is the expected value given the public signals only. Applying Mil-
grom [24, Proposition 2], if Fx, Fy, and Fz satisfy MLRP, then ^ µ(xj;yj;zj) is
strictly increasing for all xj 2 X, yj 2 Y , and zj 2 Z. Similarly for · µ(xj;zj).
A simplifying assumption we make throughout the paper is that yj is a
binary signal: Y = f0;1g. the insider signal is either good or bad. This as-
10It is assumed that candidates do not observe the insider signal. This assumption
avoids the possibility that candidates signal their good type by adopting bad policies
(choosing a position far away from the median voter is a costly signal). While this case
may be interesting in its own, it lies outside the scope of this paper. Of course, in a
separating equilibrium candidates infer the insider signal from the group's o®er.
11Indeed, the presence of xj in this model is not necessary for most results.
12A cumulative distribution function F(¢j¢) satis¯es MLRP if its p.d.f. f(¢j¢) is such
that, for every s










8sumptionwill allow us to characterize the incentive-compatibility constraints
in a simple way.
2.3 Voters' Choice
Let ~ µj 2 < represent the expected value of µj, conditional on the voters' in-
formation at the moment of the vote.13 Given ~ µj, Voter i votes for Candidate
1 if and only if
~ µ1 ¡ ~ µ2 ¡u(pi ¡p1) +u(pi ¡p2) ¸ 0
Let m denote the median voter and pm the median voter's ideal policy:




pi>pm di. The proof of the
following is immediate:
Lemma 1 Candidate 1 is elected if and only if
~ µ1 ¡ ~ µ2 ¡ u(pm ¡p1) +u(pm ¡p2) ¸ 0
A candidate is elected if and only if he is preferred by the median voter.
The median voter evaluates candidates on how high their expected valences
are and on how close to the median voter's ideal position their policies are.
2.4 Candidates
The only goal of a candidate is to win the election. He derives no direct
utility from policy or valence. While his valence is given, Candidate j chooses
his policy position pj, which is publicly observable.
Consider the policy choice of Candidate j. Given Lemma 1, for any
voters' belief on valence and for any policy chosen by the other candidate
(¡j), j maximizes his election chances by choosing pj = pm:
Lemma 2 For any distribution of probability over ~ µj and ~ µ¡j and for any
p¡j, pj = pm is a best response.
Lacking any other in°uence, both candidates should choose the median
voter's ideal policy.
13This paper abstracts from the problem of the heterogeneity of information among
voters and its aggregation. All voters observe the same signals and hold the same beliefs.
Section 6 discusses this assumption.
92.5 Interest Group
An interest group leader acts as the representative of a subset of the voters
regarding the policy dimension. The subset has mass ¹ and median member
g > m. The group leader, G, maximizes the policy component of the utility
of the median group member. The interest group is therefore not directly
interested in the valence of candidates.14 G can make contributions to can-
didates 1 and 2, denoted respectively with A1 and A2. The group's payo®
is assumed to be separable in contributions and policy. The payo® to G if e
is elected is ¡¹u(pg ¡pe) ¡ A1 ¡ A2.15
G announces a desired policy p¤ and then she can make an o®er A¤
1 to
1 and an o®er A¤
2 to 2. Each candidate can accept or reject the o®er. If
he accepts, he receives a campaign contribution Aj = A¤
j and commits to
implementing p¤ if elected. If he rejects, he receives Aj = 0 but he is free of
choosing any policy position. If the candidate accepts the contribution, he
can use it for not directly informative campaign advertising.16
3 When Only One Candidate Can Receive Con-
tributions
This model takes into account interactions on three levels: (a) How a can-
didate in°uences voters' beliefs through advertising, (b) How the group ex-
changes contributions for favorable policies, and (c) How candidates compete
14If the group represents a subset of voters, one may think it should care about both
policy and valence. However, there are two reasons to believe that the group should
be more concerned about policy. The ¯rst is that there can exist an agency problem
between the group members and the group leader. Suppose that, while outcomes on the
policy dimension can be contracted upon, outcomes on the valence dimension are hard
to measure and to verify. Then, the group leader only has an incentive to perform on
the policy line. The second reason has to do with the free-riding problem. If voters have
identical preferences over valence but disagree over policy, one can expect that subsets of
policy-homogeneous voters will have more incentives to pool resources to in°uence policy
rather than to enhance valence.
15A1 and A2 do not enter the other players' utilities. Thus, the assumption that they
enter G's utility function in a linear way and with unitary coe±cients is without loss of
generality.
16This model assumes that a candidate can credibly commit to implement p
¤ if elected.
It is mostly an open question { outside the scope of this paper { why the candidate should
live up to its pre-electoral promises to interest groups (See however Austen-Smith [2] for
self-enforcing agreements in which the candidate credibly promises his group `access' to
the policy-making process in exchange for a contribution).
10with each other for contributions. For illustrative purposes, it is useful to
fully explore (a) and (b) before including (c). This section makes the tem-
porary assumption that the group can only contribute to Candidate 1 and
that there is no uncertainty about the valence of Candidate 2.
Assumption 2 (i) G can only make o®ers to Candidate 1 and (ii) µ2 ´ 0.
Assumption 2 is maintained throughout this section and will be dropped
in Section 4.
To summarize, the electoral race is represented as follows:
Game 1 The players are: voter i 2 I, candidate j 2 f1;2g, and interest
group G. The game consists of four stages:
1. Nature: Nature chooses µ1 2 £, which remains unknown to all players.
µ2 ´ 0. x1 2 X is realized and becomes common knowledge among all
players.
2. Insider Stage: G observes y1 2 f0;1g, selects p¤, and o®ers A¤
1 to 1. 1
accepts or rejects. If he rejects, then he makes advertising expenditure
A1 = 0 but he is free to set p1. If he accepts, then A1 = A¤
1 and
p1 = p¤. A2 ´ 0 and 2 is free to set p2.17
3. Public Stage: z1 2 Z is realized. Voters observe p1, p2, A1, and z1.
For i 2 I, Voter i votes for either 1 or 2. Let e denote the candidate
that receives the higher number of votes and let ¡e denote the other
candidate.
4. Payo® Distribution: µ1 is revealed. Voter i receives µe ¡u(pe ¡ pi). e
receives 1 and ¡e receives 0. G receives u(pg ¡pe)¡ A1.
The players' strategies are: p¤ 2 < and A¤
1 2 [0;1) for G; f\accept",\reject"g
and p1 2 < (if \reject") for 1; p2 2 < for 2; and ei 2 f1;2g for i.
17Here we assume that G makes o®ers in the time window after she observes yj but
before she observes zj. If she made o®ers before or after this time window, it can be
shown that advertising is never credible. Therefore, even if G is free to choose when to
make a contribution, she will only make it in the `credible' time window. With a more
complex information structure (for instance, one with a continuous sequence of both public
and insider signals) the credible time window could cover the whole campaign.
113.1 Equilibrium under Advertising Ban
As a benchmark, consider the case in which advertising (or campaign giving)
is prohibited by law (A1 ´ 0). By Lemma 2, candidates will set p1 = p2 =
pm. By Lemma 1, Candidate 1 will be elected if and only if x and z are such
that · µ(x;z) ¸ 0. Let ¹ zP(x) be the unique solution to · µ(x; ¹ zP(x)) = 0 for all
x 2 X. ¹ zP is strictly decreasing in x.
Proposition 1 Under an advertising ban, pj = pm for j = 1;2 and e = 1
if and only if x and z are such that z > ¹ zP(x).
Under an advertising ban, candidates cannot do anything to in°uence
the voters' beliefs over the valence dimension. Their optimal strategy is to
cater to the median voter on the policy dimension.
3.2 Equilibrium with Advertising
In a separating equilibrium, three conditions must be satis¯ed: (1) A1 must
reveal the value of y. This translates into an incentive-compatibility con-
straint on A¤
1; (2) given the ICC, 1 must be better o® accepting the o®er than
rejecting the o®er. This translates into a participation constraint on p¤; and
(3) Given the ICC and the PC, G must select the level of p¤ that maximizes
her bene¯t. This determines an optimal p¤. In general, the PC may or may
not bind according to the value of the optimal p¤. Let us consider the three
conditions one at a time:
3.2.1 Incentive-Compatibility Constraint for G
Let ¹ z(x1;y1;p1) denote the unique value of z1 for which
^ µ(x1;y1;z1) +u(pm ¡ p1) ¡u(0) = 0
If we suppose that x1 has been realized, that voters believe y1, that 1
chooses p1, and that 2 chooses p2 = pm (a consequence of Lemma 2), then
¹ z(x1;y1;p1) represents the lowest realization of z1 at which 1 is elected. ¹ z is
strictly decreasing in x1, z1 and strictly increasing in p1 for p1 > pm.18
If both candidates choose pm, G's payo® is certainly ¡¹u(pg ¡pm). Let
¦y(p¤) = ¹Pr
h
^ µ(x;1;z) ¡u(p¤ ¡pm) ¡u(0) ¸ 0
¯ ¯ ¯x;y
i
[u(pg ¡pm) ¡ u(pg ¡ p¤)]
(1)
18As we have assumed that pg > pm, it is obvious that 1 will never choose p1 < pm.
12¦y(p) is the expected payo® of G net of ¡¹u(pg ¡ pm), given that 1 has
accepted policy p¤. ¦y(p) is gross of the contribution A¤
i, which will be
determined shortly. To avoid confusion between candidate subscripts and
realizations of y, let ¦H = ¦1 and ¦L = ¦0 as in `high type' and `low type'.
¦H(p¤) represents the gross expected payo® for G if her candidate is
a high-type and voters believe her candidate is a high type. On the other
hand, ¦L(p¤) represents the gross expected payo® for G if her candidate is
a low-type and voters believe her candidate is a high type. In a separating
equilibrium, given p¤, the contribution A1 must be such that
¦L(p¤) · A1 < ¦H(p¤) (2)
Then, a group with a high-type candidate can make an o®er that a group
with a low-type candidate cannot a®ord.
Lemma 3 For any p¤ 2 (0;1), there exists an A¤(p¤) 2 (0;1) such that
¦H(p¤) > A¤(p¤) ¸ ¦L(p¤)
Condition (2) is standard in models of uninformative advertising (See
for instance Milgrom and Roberts [25]). It is a necessary condition for the
existence of a separating equilibrium. In this model it is always satis¯ed. It
is always true that the group has more to gain by contributing to a high-type
candidate than to a low-type candidate. This is because y1 can be used to
predict z1. The conditional distribution of z1 given y1 = 1 dominates (in a
¯rst-order stochastic sense) the conditional distribution of z1 given y1 = 1.
Thus, for any given policy o®er, a group with a high-type has a higher
expected payo® than a group with a low-type.19
Remark 1 If we assumed that y1 is perfectly informative, then Condi-
tion (2) would not hold.
Suppose that y1 is perfectly informative. Then, if voters know y1, they
can infer µ1. Then, in a separating equilibrium, voters decide based only
on y1 and they do not look at z1. If voters believe y1 = 1, a group with a
high-type candidate has the same expected payo® as a group with a low-type
candidate. Thus, Condition (2) does not hold.20
19It is important to stress that x1 and z1 are not positively correlated: this would
amount to assuming the result. x1 and z1 are mutually independent given any value of
µ1. The reason why y1 can be used to predict z1 is because µ1 is unknown.
20Still, when y1 is perfectly informative, a separating equilibrium can exist. However,
this equilibrium is both arbitrary and brittle, as Section s-gerber of the Appendix shows.
133.2.2 Participation Constraint for 1:
Candidate 1 wants a high ~ µ1 and a p1 close to pm. If he does not accept
a contribution, he sets p1 = pm. If he accepts a contribution, he must set
p1 = p¤, which, in itself, decreases his chance of being elected. If he spends
less that ¦L(p¤) on advertising, voters will believe ~ µ1 = ^ µ(x;0;z). Thus,
he can only lose by accepting a contribution of less than ¦L(p¤). If, on
the contrary, he spends at least ¦L(p¤) on advertising, voters will believe
~ µ1 = ^ µ(x;1;z). He will accept such a contribution only if the policy he is
asked to implement is not too far from the median voter's ideal policy.
Lemma 4 In a separating equilibrium, 1 rejects any o®er A¤
1 < ¦L(p¤). He
accepts an o®er A¤
1 ¸ ¦L(p¤) if and only if p¤ · ¹ p where ¹ p(x1) is the largest
p such that
¹ z(x1;1;p) · ¹ z(x1;0;pm)
3.2.3 Optimal O®er for G
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 restrict the set of o®ers G can make. A¤
1 cannot be
lower than ¦L(p¤) and p¤ cannot be higher than ¹ p. Obviously, G will not
make an o®er strictly above ¦L(p¤). Still, G faces a continuum of possible
o®ers corresponding to 0 · p¤ · ¹ p. What is the optimal choice from the
point of view of G?
Lemma 5 In a separating equilibrium, G sets p¤ = pmax, where
pmax = argmaxp¦H(p) ¡ ¦L(p)
subject to p¤ · ¹ p.
G chooses p¤ subject to the constraint the constraint that p¤ · ¹ p. One
may wonder whether it could be the case that the Participation Constraint
is always binding or never binding. The following is proven in Section 7.2
by means of a numerical example:
Remark 2 Both the case pmax < ¹ p and the case pmax = ¹ p are possible.
The participation constraint is not binding when pg is close to pm. It
is obvious that G will never ask for p¤ > pg. However, ¹ p is independent
of pg. So for any ¹ p, if pg is small enough, p¤ < ¹ p. On the other hand, the
participation constraint is binding when pg is high and zj is more informative
14than yj. Hold ¯xed the precision of y and increase the precision of z: voters
become less interested in learning the signal y and Candidate 1 has less to
gain from being revealed as y1 = 1 rather than y1 = 0. However, G would
still like to have a policy position close to pg.
3.2.4 Equilibrium
After having examined the incentive-compatibility constraint, the participa-
tion constraint, and the solution to G's constrained-maximization problem,
it is now possible to characterize the separating equilibrium with advertising:
Proposition 2 A sequential equilibrium of Game 1 is
(i) Voters' beliefs: For any p1 2 (0;1)
~ µ =
(
^ µ(x;1;z) if A1 ¸ ¦L(p1) > 0
^ µ(x;0;z) otherwise
(ii) Voters' choice: ei = 1 if and only if ~ µ ¡u(pi ¡p1)¡u(pi ¡p2) > 0. 1
is elected if and only if ~ µ ¡u(pm ¡ p1) ¡u(pm ¡ p2) > 0




¦L(p¤) if y1 = 1
0 if y1 = 0
(iv) Candidate 1 accepts A¤
1 if and only if A¤
1 ¸ ¦L(p¤) and p¤ · ¹ p. If he
rejects, p1 = pm.
(v) Candidate 2 sets p2 = pm.
Proof: (i) ~ µ is consistent with (iii) and (iv). (ii) By Lemma 1. (iii) pmax is
optimal by Lemma 5 and A¤
1 is consistent with (i), (iv), and Lemma 3. (iv)
Best response given (i), (ii), and Lemma 4. In case of rejection, Lemma 2
applies. (v) By Lemma 2. 2
The intuition for the existence of a separating equilibrium has to do with
the con¯dence G has in the election chances of Candidate 1. When G makes
a contribution to 1, she undertakes a risky investment. She forgoes A¤
1 for
sure: if 1 is elected, she bene¯ts of a favorable policy; if 2 is elected, she
15gets the same policy she would have gotten if she had made no contribution.
Thus, G is more willing to invest in Candidate 1 if 1 has a higher chance
of producing a high z1. G is more con¯dent that z1 will be high if she has
observed y1 = 1 than if she has observed y1 = 0. If y1 = 1, G can make
a contribution that she could not a®ord if y1 = 0. If voters observe such a
contribution, they must infer y1 = 1.
The separating equilibrium takes two forms according to whether the
participation constraint of Candidate 1 is binding or not. If the preferences
of G are close to the preferences of the median voter or if the insider signal
is highly informative, the participation constraint is likely to be nonbinding.
Then, G chooses p¤ = pmax, which maximizes the expected payo® subject
to the constraint that A¤(p¤) be separating. If, on the other hand, G's
preferences are distant from the median voter's preferences and the insider
signal is not very informative, then the participation constraint tends to be
binding. G sets p¤ = ¹ p.
3.3 Pooling Equilibrium
Let us investigate whether a pooling equilibrium can exist. By de¯nition,
in a pooling equilibrium, p1 and A1 do not depend on y1. Pooling equilibria
with p1 6= pm can be ruled out by a deviation from candidate 1. On the
other hand it is easy to see that the pooling equilibrium in which 1 rejects
all o®ers from G and p1 = pm is a sequential equilibrium of Game 1. Such a
pooling equilibrium, in which G plays no role, is identical to the equilibrium
under Advertising Ban of Proposition 1.
The equilibrium is supported by the following voters' belief: ~ µ = · µ(x;z)
independently of the value of A1. In a pooling equilibrium, voters do not
listen to campaign advertising and candidates, anticipating that advertising
is useless, reject all contributions. Thus, the pooling equilibrium relies on
the out-of-equilibrium belief ~ µ = · µ(x;z) if A¤
1 > 0. Is this plausible?
The signalling game literature has developed several re¯nement concepts
with the goal of ruling out equilibria based on implausible out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. One of the most widely used is the Intuitive Criterion introduced
by Cho and Kreps [7]. In the present model, a sequential equilibrium fails
the Intuitive Criterion if there exists a deviation that is pro¯table for both
G and 1 if and only if G has observed y1 = 1.
Proposition 3 The pooling equilibrium does not survive the Intuitive Cri-
terion.
16Game 1 can be seen as a signalling game with two types of senders: G
with private information y1 = 1 and G with private information y1 = 0.
The ¯rst type is strictly better o® in a separating equilibrium than in a
pooling equilibrium. The second type is indi®erent (she gets a zero-payo®
in both equilibria). The ¯rst type can o®er Candidate 1 a contribution that
the second type cannot a®ord. By observing such a contribution, voters
must infer that the sender is of the ¯rst type. Provided the participation
constraint is satis¯ed, a candidate should accept that contribution. For this
reason, a sender of the ¯rst type can deviate from the pooling equilibrium
in a way that is both credible and pro¯table. This shows that the pooling
equilibrium is implausible.
3.4 Welfare









Let us assume that, for i 2 I, pi is symmetrically distributed around
pm. Recall that u(¢) is symmetric around pi. Then, as is well known, W
is maximized when the ex-post welfare of the median voter is maximized.
Thus, from now on we focus on w = µe ¡u(pi ¡pe), which can be expressed
as a function of e and p1:
w(e;p1) =
(
µ1 ¡u(pm ¡ p1) if e = 1
¡u(0) if e = 2
In the separating equilibrium of Proposition 2,
w(e;p1) = wS(e;y1;p¤) =
(
µ1 ¡u(pm ¡p¤) if e = 1 and y1 = 1
¡u(0) otherwise
(3)
while in the equilibrium under advertising ban as in Proposition 1,
w(e;p1) = wP(e) =
(
µ1 ¡ u(0) if e = 1
¡u(0) if e = 2
21As G is made of a subset of voters, the payo® of group members is already included
in the voter welfare.
17Let the expected voter welfare be the expected payo® for m after x is re-
alized but before y and z are observed.22 Under a separating equilibrium,
the expected voter welfare is ¹ wS(p¤) = Eµ(wS(e;y1;p¤)jx), while under the
advertising ban, ¹ wP = Eµ(wP(e)jx). Let us ¯rst consider the case in which
the Participation Constraint binds, that is p¤ = ¹ p.
Lemma 6 if p¤ = ¹ p, the separating equilibrium yields the same voting out-
come as an equilibrium under advertising ban in which voters use the rule
e = 1 , · µ(x;z) ¸ b(x)
where b(x) > 0 for all x 2 X, instead of using the rule
e = 1 , · µ(x;z) ¸ 0
Thus, ¹ wS(¹ p) < ¹ wP.
Lemma 6 examines the case in which Candidate 1's participation con-
straint is binding. In that case, the expected voter welfare under an adver-
tising ban is strictly higher than the expected voter welfare with advertising.
What is the intuition behind this result?
If the participation constraint is binding, Candidate 1 is exactly indif-
ferent between: (a) being revealed as y1 = 1 and choosing p¤; or (b) being
revealed as y0 = 0 and choosing pm. He is indi®erent because he is elected
under (a) if and only if he is elected under (b). If the candidate were more
likely to be elected under (a) than under (b), the participation constraint
would not be binding, while if he were more likely to be elected under (b)
than under (a), he would reject G's o®er. In equilibrium, if the insider signal
is good, case (a) occurs, while, if the insider signal is bad, case (b) occurs.
Notice however that case (b) is equivalent to the following scenario: G does
not exist; voters observe the insider signal directly; the insider signal hap-
pens to be bad. As Candidate 1 is elected under (a) if and only if he is
elected under (b), voters behave as if they always had a `bad' Candidate 1.
In general G uses its insider signal to extract rent from voters in the
form of biased policy. If the participation constraint is binding, it means
that G has pushed the policy bias to the point at which, in the eyes of voters,
there is no di®erence between a good candidate with a biased policy and a
bad candidate with an unbiased policy. Thus, it is as if voters encountered
22The welfare analysis holds a fortiori if the expected voter welfare is de¯ned as the
expected payo® before x is realized.
18only bad candidates with unbiased policies. However, in an equilibrium
under advertising ban, voters encounter only `average' candidates (that is,
candidates for whom the insider signal can be good or bad). Under an
advertising ban, candidates always adopt an unbiased policy. Thus, voters
are strictly better o® under an advertising ban than under a separating
equilibrium.
Let us now characterize the general case in which the participation con-
straint may or may not be binding:
Proposition 4 for any x 2 X, there exists a k 2 (0; ¹ p) such that ¹ wS(pmax) <
¹ wP when pmax 2 (k;1), ¹ wS(pmax) = ¹ wP when pmax = k, and ¹ wS(pmax) >
¹ wP when pmax 2 (0;k), .
If the participation constraint is not binding, G still extracts all the rent
she can extract, but, in doing so, she leaves some informational rent to vot-
ers. Now it is not anymore as if voters encountered only bad candidates with
unbiased policies. By the fact that the expected voter welfare is continuous
and strictly decreasing in p¤, there exists a policy k 2 (0; ¹ p) such that if
p¤ = k voters are indi®erent between prohibiting advertising and allowing
advertising. If the goal of G or the information structure is such that p¤ > k,
voters would like advertising to be banned. If, on the other hand, p¤ < k,
advertising is bene¯cial.
4 When Both Candidates Can Receive Contribu-
tions
The previous section relied on the assumptions that the valence of Candidate
2 is known and that G can only contribute to Candidate 1. This section
removes both assumptions.
4.1 Modi¯cations to the Model
Assumption 2 is substituted with
Assumption 3 G can make an o®er to each candidate. O®ers are simul-
taneous and secret.
G can try to win the favors of both candidates. The assumption that
o®ers are simultaneous excludes the possibility that G makes an o®er to
19one candidate, waits for his reply, and then makes an o®er to the other
candidate. While it may be more realistic, this possibility is outside the
scope of this paper. The assumption that o®ers are secret means that A¤
j is
not observed by Candidate ¡j. This is to avoid the possibility that G could
pre-commit to ¯nancing only one of the two candidates.
Let us make the following simplifying assumptions on the primitives of
the model:
Assumption 4 (i) x1 ´ x2 ´ 0; (ii) Á(µj) is symmetric around the mean;
(iv) voters do not observe z1 and z2 but only z = z1 ¡ z2; (v) G does not
observe y1 and y2 but only y = y1 ¡y2.
Part (i) of the assumption eliminates the incumbent advantage and
makes candidates equal before until the insider signal is observed. Parts
(ii) guarantees the symmetry of the problem. Parts (iv) and (v) assume
that voters and groups can only observe the di®erences between signals and
not the absolute value of signals. Although Assumption 4 does not appear
to be central to the results that are going to be presented, it is useful be-
cause it leads to a simple characterization of the participation constraints
for candidates.
With Assumption 4, it is possible to rewrite the problem in terms of dif-
ferences rather than absolute values. The domains of y and z are respectively
~ Y = f¡1;0;1g and ~ Z = fz1 ¡z2j8z1 2 Z;8z2 2 Zg.
Taking into account Assumptions 3, Assumptions 4, and the new de¯n-
itions, Game 1 becomes:
Game 2 The players are: voter i 2 I, candidate j 2 f1;2g, and interest
group G. The game consists of four stages:
1. Nature: Nature chooses µ1 2 £ and µ2 2 £, which remain unknown to
all players.
2. Insider Stage: G observes y 2 f¡1;0;1g; announces p¤; and makes
o®ers A¤
1 ¸ 0 and A¤
2 ¸ 0. Candidate j does not observe A¤
¡j. If
candidate j accepts the o®er, then he must set pj = p¤. If he rejects,
he is free to decide pi.
3. Public Stage: z 2 ~ Z is realized. Voters observe p1, p2, A1, A2, and z.
For i 2 I, Voter i votes for either 1 or 2. Let e denote the candidate
that receives the higher number of votes.
204. Payo® Distribution: µ1 and µ2 are revealed. Voter i receives µe¡u(pe¡
p1). e receives 1 and ¡e receives 0. G receives ¡u(pg ¡pe)¡A1¡A2.
The players' strategies are: For G, p¤ 2 < and A¤
j 2 [0;1) with j = 1;2;
For Candidate j 2 f1;2g, f\accept",\reject"g and pj 2 < (if \reject"); For
Voter i 2 I, ei 2 f1;2g.
Let H indicate Candidate 1 and L indicate Candidate 2 if y = 1 and
viceversa if y = ¡1. Let M (as in `medium quality') indicate both candidates
if y = 0.
4.2 Equilibrium
As in the previous section, we need to take into account three factors: (1) the
incentive-compatibility constraints for G; (2) the participation constraints
for the candidates; and (3) the optimal choice of p¤ for G. Factors (1) and
(2) will di®er from the previous section. Instead of one constraint, there will
be multiple constraints for each candidate.
4.2.1 Incentive-Compatibility Constraints
In a fully separating equilibrium, G must contribute only to H if y 6= 0
and to neither or both candidates if y = 0. It turns out that there are two
separating equilibria according to whether a G with y = 0 contributes to both
candidates or contributes to neither candidates. The former is labeled\Split-
Contribution Equilibrium" and is analyzed here. The second is labeled \No-
Split-Contribution Equilibrium" and is analyzed in Section 7.3. That section
will argue that a no-split-contribution equilibrium is defeated (in the sense
of Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite [23]) by a split-contribution
equilibrium and therefore is unlikely to arise.
Let us rede¯ne ^ µ as
^ µ(y;z) = E(µ1 ¡µ2jy;z)
^ µ(y;z) is strictly increasing in y and z. Notice that, as the voters' utility is
separable in valence and policy, voters gain nothing by basing their decisions
on both E(µ1jy;z) and E(µ2jy;z) rather than only on E(µ1 ¡µ2jy;z).
Let ¦y(p¤) be de¯ned analogously to (1) except that now y 2 f¡1;0;1g:
¦y(p) = ¹Pr
h
^ µ(1;z) ¡ u(p¤ ¡ pm)¡ u(0) ¸ 0
¯ ¯ ¯y
i
[u(pg ¡ pm) ¡u(pg ¡p¤)]
21Let ¦H(p¤) = ¦1(p¤), ¦M(p¤) = ¦1(p¤), and ¦L(p¤) = ¦1(p¤). For in-
stance, ¦H(p¤) denotes the expected gross payo® to G if exactly one can-
didate has accepted an o®er and that candidate is of type H (given the
symmetry of the problem, it does not matter whether H = 1 or H = 2).
Also, let
¦all(p¤) = ¹[u(pg ¡ pm) ¡u(pg ¡p¤)
¦all(p¤) is the expected (and ex-post) gross payo® of G if both candidates
have accepted G's o®er. Let us also de¯ne ®(p¤) = ¦all(p¤) ¡¦H(p¤).
Lemma 7 Suppose that candidates always accept an o®er of ®(p¤). If y 6=
0, then G is willing to o®er ®(p¤) to H but not to L. If y = 0, then G is
willing to o®er ®(p¤) to both candidates.
If candidates are equally good, G makes an o®er to both. If one is
better than the other, G makes an o®er only to the better one. Under this
strategy, G's insider information is fully revealed to voters. If A1 ¸ ®(p¤)
and A2 ¸ ®(p¤), voters infer that y = 0. If A1 ¸ ®(p¤) and A2 < ®(p¤),
voters infer that y = 1. If A1 < ®(p¤) and A2 ¸ ®(p¤), voters infer that
y = ¡1.
4.2.2 Participation Constraints
Let z(y;p1;p2) be the unique solution to
^ µ(y;z) ¡ u(pm ¡p1)+ u(pm ¡p2) = 0
z is continuous and increasing in ¡y, p1, -p2.
Recall that candidates do not observe y. However, in equilibrium, can-
didates of type L are not made o®ers. Thus, if a candidate is made an o®er,
he knows he must be H or M. Let us, for the moment assume that the
candidate knows if he is H or M and let us write down the participation
constraints for the two cases.
If y 6= 0, let us assume without loss of generality that y = 1. Then, only
Candidate 1 is made an o®er. If he accepts, voters believe y = 1. If he rejects,
voters believe y = 0. Thus, 1 accepts if he prefers (y = 1;p1 = p¤;p2 = pm)
to (y = 0;p1 = pm;p2 = pm), that is
¹ z(1;p¤;pm) ¸ z(0;pm;pm) (4)
If y = 0, both candidates are made o®ers. The subgame between candi-
dates is as follows: if they both accept or both reject, voters believe y = 0;
22if j accepts and ¡j rejects, voters believe y 6= 0 and j = H and ¡j = L.
It is optimal for 1 to accept if he prefers (y = 0;p1 = p¤;p2 = p¤) to
(y = ¡1;p1 = pm;p2 = p¤), that is
¹ z(0;p¤;p¤) ¸ z(¡1;pm;p¤) (5)
Let p be the unique p for which z(1;p;pm) = 0 (p may be higher than,
equal to, or lower than p). Then,
Lemma 8 Candidate j accepts A¤
j ¸ ®(p¤) if and only if p¤ · p and rejects
any o®er below ®(p¤).
Lemma 8 has a simple form because it turns out that constraints (4) and
(5) are equivalent. This is due to Assumption 4 and greatly simpli¯es the
problem at hand. Lemma 8 is analogous to Lemma 4 except that p is in
general di®erent from ¹ p (without further assumptions, it is not possible to
say whether p is greater or smaller that ¹ p).
4.2.3 Optimal O®er for G
Given the incentive-compatibility constraint in Lemma 7 and the partici-
pation constraint in Lemma 8, G chooses p¤ in order to maximize the net
expected payo®. Analogously to the previous section,23
Lemma 9 In a separating equilibrium, G sets p¤ = pmax, where
p
max = argmaxp2¦H(p) ¡ ¦all(p)
subject to p¤ · p.
If the participation constraint is binding, pmax = p. If the participation
constraint is not binding, pmax < p.
4.2.4 Equilibrium






^ µ(1;z) if A1 ¸ ®(p¤) and A2 < ®(p¤)
^ µ(0;z) = if max(A1;A2) < ®(p¤) or min(A1;A2 ¸ ®(p¤)
^ µ(¡1;z) if A1 < ®(p¤) and A2 ¸ ®(p¤)
23In general p
max 6= pmax.
23(ii) Voters' choice: ei = 1 if and only if ~ µ ¡u(pi ¡p1)¡u(pi ¡p2) > 0. 1
is elected if and only if ~ µ ¡u(pm ¡ p1) ¡u(pm ¡ p2) > 0.
(iii) Group's o®er: For y 2 f¡1;0;1g, p¤ = pmax, and
(a) If y = ¡1, A¤
1 = 0 and A¤
2 = ®(p¤);
(b) If y = 0, A¤
1 = A¤
2 = ®(p¤);
(c) If y = 1, A¤
1 = ®(p¤) and A¤
2 = 0.
(iv) Candidates' acceptance: for j = 1;2, Candidate j accepts A¤
j if and
only if A¤
j ¸ ®(p¤) and p¤ · p. If j rejects, pj = pm.
Two cases are possible: y = 0 and y 6= 0. In the ¯rst case, G makes an
o®er ®(p¤) to both candidates and both candidates accept. In the second
case, G makes an o®er only to H and H accepts. If voters observe that both
candidates advertise, they infer y = 0. If voters observe that 1 advertises
and 2 does not, they infer y = 1, and viceversa if only 2 advertises. Thus,
the equilibrium fully reveals y. The o®er is set at ®(p¤), which corresponds
to the di®erence between the gross expected payo® when G contributes to
both H and L and the gross expected payo® when G contributes to H only.
In equilibrium, an advertising level of at least Aj = ®(p¤) guarantees voters
that j 6= L. 24
4.3 Split Contributions
It is worth spelling out the following:
Corollary 1 In the Split-Contribution Equilibrium, if y = 0, G o®ers a
contribution to both candidates, both candidates accept, and p is implemented
for sure. If Candidate j rejected the contribution, voters would believe j = L
and ¡j = H.
24One may wonder if there could be a separating equilibrium in which, if y 6= 0, G
makes an in¯nitesimal contribution to H and a zero-contribution to L. This equilibrium
could be seen as an endorsement µ a la Grossman and Helpman [13]. If G could commit to
contribute to exactly one candidate, such equilibrium would indeed exist. However, this
possibility is excluded in the present model by the assumption that o®ers are secret. G has
no way of committing to contribute to only one candidate. The only way to ensure that G





24When y = 0, G has an implicit threat against both candidates. If one
of the candidates rejects the contribution, only the other candidate will
advertise and voters will perceive the candidate who advertises as H and
the candidate who does not advertise as L.25
Split contributions are a tool G uses to extract rent from voters. Would
a ban on split contributions (assuming that it is feasible) be optimal from
the point of view of voters?
Proposition 6 A ban on split contributions always increases the ex-ante
voter welfare.
If split contributions are banned, full revelation of y will still occur but,
when y = 0, neither candidate will advertise and candidates will select pm
rather than p. Voters will be better o® and G will be worse o®. Thus, a ban
on split contributions always increases the voter welfare.
4.4 Voter Welfare
What happens to voter welfare if advertising is banned altogether? The
answer is analogous to the answer in the case in which G can only contribute
to Candidate 1. A formal statement is super°uous. If the participation
constraint of the candidates is binding, that is if p = p
max, then by an
argument analogous to Lemma 6, a ban on advertising certainly increases
voter welfare. If the participation constraint is not binding, then a ban on
advertising may or may ot be optimal according to how close p is to pm.
5 Discussion and Extensions
This section tackles some important aspects of campaign advertising that
were disregarded in the previous sections. For ease of exposition, we refer
to the simpler model of Section 3.
25In the present model, when y = 0, candidates are indi®erent between the situation in
which both advertise and the hypothetical situation in which neither advertises. However,
we could assume that each candidate derives a small, but positive, utility from catering to
voters. Then, candidates would strictly prefer the situation in which neither advertise to
the situation in which both advertise. However, in equilibrium, it would still be a dominant
strategy for candidate j to accept G's o®er. This equilibrium is Pareto-ine±cient from the
point of view of candidates. If candidates could commit not to accept contributions, they
would be better o®. This situation is known in the political literature as the \Candidates'
Prisoner Dilemma."
255.1 Unobservable Policy Choice
The model has assumed that, before the election, voters observe policies
p1 and p2 that candidates are going to adopt if elected. Suppose on the
contrary that p1 and p2 are unobservable. For the rest, let us consider an
electoral race as in Game 1.
There is, however, one problem with a model in which pj is unobservable
and candidates maximize only their election chances: candidates are indif-
ferent among policy positions. To sidestep this problem, let us assume that
candidates pursue two goals: election and the maximization of the median
voter's welfare. However, the second goal is in¯nitely less important that
the second. Thus, if a candidate does not receive a contribution, he will
choose pm.26
Then,
Proposition 7 If pg > ¹ p, there exists no separating equilibrium. If pg ·
¹ p, there exists a separating equilibrium which is identical to the separating
equilibrium in Proposition 2 except that p¤ = pg and A¤
1 = ¦L(pg).
If the candidate's policy choice is unobservable, G will take all the ad-
vantage she can from making an o®er. Thus, she will ask the candidate to
implement pg if he is elected. Voters realize that a candidate who advertises
is going to implement pg. Thus, even if voters do not observe p1, they can
anticipate it perfectly. If pg is not too high, the median voter prefers (for the
same z) a candidate who advertises to a candidate who does not advertise.
If pg is very high, then the median voter prefers a candidate who does not
advertise. In that case, candidates would reject a contribution from G.
The case pg > ¹ p corresponds to a notoriously extremist group. The
median voter punishes anyone who associates with such group. An example
may be represented by the tobacco industry in the US, whose ideal policies
seem to be hated by the median voter. A candidate who is caught receiving
money from the tobacco industry is likely to be stygmatized by the media
and by his opponents. Thus, most candidates reject any contribution from
tobacco interests.
On the welfare side, the results that were proven for the case in which
policy is observed carry on to the present case. It is immediate that Propo-
sition 4 holds as stated, except that pmax is substituted with pg.
26The same candidate behavior would be achieved in a model in which pj is observed
with an in¯nitesimal probability.
265.2 Candidates Make O®ers
The model has given all the bargaining power to G by assuming that G can
make candidates a take-it-or-leave-it o®er. Let us consider the opposite case.
It will be shown that results change dramatically if policy is observable and
are almost unchanged if policy is unobservable.
Let modify Game 1 by assuming that 1 asks G for contribution A¤
1 in
exchange for policy p¤ and A¤
1. G accepts or rejects. The following is
immediate.
Proposition 8 If candidates make o®ers and p1 is observable, there exists
a separating equilibrium in which 1 o®ers p¤ = pm + ², where ² is positive
and in¯nitesimal, and asks for A¤
1 = ¦L(pm + ²). G accepts if and only if
y1 = 1.
For any p¤, 1 can ask G for a contribution that G can a®ord only if y = 1.
To maximize the chance of election, 1 sets p¤ as low as possible. Revelation
occurs at an in¯nitesimal cost. Thus,
Corollary 2 If candidates make o®ers and p1 is observable, an advertising
ban is never optimal.
However, this result relies on the perfect observability of p1. If, on the
contrary, we assume that p1 is unobservable, we have
Proposition 9 Suppose candidates make o®ers and p1 is unobservable. Let
P be the lowest solution to ¦H(P) = ¦L(pg). If P > ¹ p, there exists no
separating equilibrium. If P < ¹ p, there exists a separating equilibrium in
which 1 o®ers p¤ = P and asks for A¤
1 = ¦L(pg). G accepts if and only if
y = 1.
The equilibrium in Proposition 9 is identical to the equilibrium in Propo-
sition 7 except that P < pg. As the candidate, rather than G, has the
bargaining power, he will choose the lowest p¤ that satis¯es the incentive-
compatibility constraint. However, in general, P is not in¯nitesimal: P can
take any value in (0; ¹ p]. Thus, it is easy to see that Proposition 4 holds as
stated, except that pmax is replaced with P. Therefore:
Corollary 3 If candidates make o®ers and p1 is unobservable, a ban on
advertising can be optimal.
275.3 Self-Financing Candidates
This model has assumed the only source of campaignfunds for candidates are
group contributions. Sometimes, however, candidates dispose of large per-
sonal wealth they can use for campaign advertising.27 One may conjecture
that the results for group-¯nanced campaigns extend readily to self-¯nanced
campaigns. As it will be seen, this conjecture is not granted. In particular,
with self-¯nanced candidates, a separating equilibrium may not exist.
Once again, reconsider Game 1. Let G be removed from the model.
Candidate 1 is risk-neutral and can borrow freely. If 1 is elected, he receives
$1. If he is not elected, he receives 0. as before, 1 derives no direct utility
from policy. Candidate 1 chooses an amount A1 2 [0;1) to be spent on
uninformative advertising.
Suppose a separating equilibrium exists. Let voters' beliefs on y1 be
denoted by ~ y1 2 f0;1g. Let R~ y1;y1 = Pr[^ µ(~ y1;z1) ¸ 0jy1]. The incentive-
compatibility constraint for 1 is
R1;0 ¡R0;0 · A1 < R1;1 ¡R0;1 (6)
which corresponds to
¡(¹ z(x;0)j1) ¡ ¡(¹ z(x;1)j1) ¸ ¡(¹ z(x;0)j0) ¡ ¡(¹ z(x;1)j0)
(6) may or may not be satis¯ed. It depends on the form of fy and fz. It
is always the case that R1;1 > R1;0. However, R0;1 > R0;0, and it is not
possible to say in general if the di®erence between R0;1 ¡ R0;0 is greater
than the di®ernce between R1;1 ¡ R1;0. Thus, (6) may or may not hold.
Then,
Proposition 10 With self-¯nancing candidates, a separating equilibrium
may not exist.
What is the di®erence between a self-¯nanced campaign and a group-
¯nanced campaign? In a group-¯nanced campaign, if G does not contribute,
she gets 0 independently of y. In a self-¯nanced campaign (and assuming
a separating equilibrium existed), if the candidate does not advertise, he
still has a positive probability of winning the election, and this probability
is higher if y = 1 than if y = 0. This reduces the incentive for a candidate
with y = 1 to signal his type.
27Recent examples of large-scale self-¯nanced campaigns include Ross Perot in the US,
Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, and Bernard Tapie in France. In 1995, a candidate to the US
Senate, Michael Hu±ngton, spent over 30 million dollars of mostly personal funds on his
campaign. For the record, he lost.
285.4 Existence of Optimal Mechanisms
Voters face a tradeo® between renouncing the insider information (advertis-
ing ban) and putting up with bad policies (equilibrium with advertising).
Can voters avoid this tradeo® altogether? Is there a mechanism through
which G reveals her information at a minimum cost for voters?
It is easy to see that many such mechanisms exist. For instance, suppose
campaign contributions are banned and G is asked to name one of the two
candidates. If the named candidate is actually elected, then G receives $1
(or an in¯nitesimal shift on the policy line). If the named candidate is
not elected, G receives nothing. With this mechanism, G will name the
candidate which has given her the highest insider signal (if x 6= 0, the odds
of the bet need to be modi¯ed in order to o®set the ex-ante advantage).
Such mechanism induces truthful revelation of y at an in¯nitesimal cost.
However, mechanisms of this type are unrealistic for two reasons. First,
they are not robust to collusion between G and the candidates: G could
o®er a candidate to name him in exchange for a favorable policy. In order
to achieve collusion-proofness, G should be promised at least as much as
she would get under the equilibrium with advertising, but that defeats the
purpose of those mechanisms. Second, these mechanisms assume that voters
and interest groups can make agreements. It is di±cult to see how an un-
organized mass of voters can be so organized to coordinate on a mechanism
choice and to make credible commitments.
6 Conclusion
An electoral race with campaign advertising has been modeled as a signal-
ing game with one interest group, two candidates, and a continuum of fully
rational voters. Two versions of the model have been developed. In the
¯rst version, the interest group can only contribute to a pre-speci¯ed candi-
date. The main results are that: (1) a separating equilibrium exists and (2)
under certain conditions, the voters' welfare is higher under an advertising
ban than under the separating equilibrium. In the second version of the
model, the group can contribute to both candidates. The main results are
similar to the ¯rst version except that, if the insider signals about the two
candidates are of equal quality, then the group will make split contributions.
Prohibiting split contributions strictly increases the voter welfare.
Campaign advertising is a complex issue. Many aspects that have been
left out by the present may, in the future, be addressed within a similar
29framework:
First, the model has assumed that only one interest group is active. It
would be important to extend the model to several groups in competition
with each other. This could be done in a common agency framework (See
for instance Grossman and Helpman [14]). A conjecture is that the nega-
tive welfare e®ects of campaign advertising disappear if interest groups are
symmetrically distributed around the median voter.28
Second, the model has assumed that the amount spent on advertising
is perfectly observable by all voters. In a more realistic framework (like
Hertzendorf [16]), advertising expenditures translate in a probability distri-
bution over the number of TV ads each voter will watch.
Third, in this model voters have heterogeneous preferences but they are
assumed to have homogeneous information: x and z are the same for all vot-
ers. The model could be extended to include heterogeneous voters informa-
tion, which will provide a link with the literature on information aggregation
in elections (e.g. Lohmann [20] or Feddersen and Pesendorfer [10]).
Lastly, in this model a ban on advertising produces the same e®ect as a
ban on contributions. In practice, there are important di®erences.29 First,
while advertising restrictions can be enforced, the experience of several coun-
tries shows that restrictions on campaign contributions are often disregarded
or dodged. Second, contributions can be spent in a variety of ways, which
give di®erent signals to di®erent voters. Thus, a ban on advertising does
not necessarily make contributions useless to candidates. Third, campaign
advertising is an expression of political opinion. Thus, restrictions on it can
be seen as restrictions on free expression and may be unconstitutional. The
¯rst argument supports restrictions on advertising, the last two arguments
point in favor of restrictions on contributions. More detailed models should
be developed with the goal of comparing the e®ects of the two types of
restrictions.
28However, in reality interest groups do not seem to be symmetrically distributed around
the median voter, but their median member appears to be more a²uent and advantaged
than the median voter. Lehman Schlozman and Tierney [19, p. 87] conduct a compre-
hensive survey on US groups and conclude that: \In terms of skew, organization members
are drawn disproportionately from the ranks of upper-status individuals { those with high
levels of income, education, and occupational prestige.[...] Surprisingly, in spite of the
appearance of new groups representing the previously underrepresented, the imbalance of
the pressure community seems to have become more pronounced in the recent years."
29The US has chosen the road of regulating contributions but letting candidates spend
freely. European countries, instead, tend to focus on spending. For instance, in Britain
individual candidates are not allowed to run TV ads.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3: It is su±cient to show that ¦H(p
¤) > ¦L(p
¤) for any p
¤ > 0.
Let ¡(tjx;y) = Pr(z · tjx;y). Then
¦y(p
¤) = (1¡ ¡(¹ z(x;1;p
¤)jx;y))¹[u(pg ¡ pm) ¡ u(pg ¡ p
¤)] (7)
Let K(µ1jx1;y1) be the posterior distribution of µ1 given x1 and y1. K(¢j¢;¢) satis¯es
FOSD. Thus, for every strictly increasing function °(¢),
R
£ °(µ)dH(µ1jx1;y1) is strictly
increasing in x1 and y1. But, because MLRP implies that Fz(z1jµ1) is a strictly decreasing





is a strictly decreasing function on x1 and y1 (that is, ¡ satis¯es FOSD). Thus, for any
z1 2 Z, ¡(z1jx1;1) < ¡(z1jx1;1). Therefore, ¦H(p¤) > ¦L(p¤) for any p¤ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4: Candidate 1 minimizes ¹ z(x1; ~ y1;p), where ~ y1 denotes the voters'
belief on y1. In a separating equilibrium, ~ y1 = 0 if A
¤
1 < ¦L(p




The ¯rst part of the lemma is immediate. If A
¤
1 < ¦L(p
¤), then G accepts the contribution
if and only if ¹ z(x1;1;p
¤) · ¹ z(x1;0;pm).














¤ · ¹ p
with A
¤






¤ · ¹ p. As ¦H(p
¤) ¡ ¦L(p
¤) is continuous and strictly positive in p
¤ except
when p
¤ ! 0 or p
¤ ! +1, the problem has at least one maximum on (0;1).
Proof of Proposition 3: Let ¹ p
d be the unique p > 0 such that ¹ z(x;1;p) =
¹ z
P(x;pm). Consider the deviation p
¤ = p
d with 0 < p






Such deviation is pro¯table to G if and only if y = 1. 1 accepts the o®er because it strictly
increases his chances of elections.
33Proof of Lemma 6: In the separating equilibrium, if y1 = 0, Candidate 1 is elected
if and only if z1 ¸ ¹ z(x1;0;pm). If y1 = 1, Candidate 1 is elected if and only if z1 ¸
¹ z(x1;1;p
¤). If p
¤ = ¹ p, Lemma 4 implies ¹ z(x1;1;p
¤) = ¹ z(x1;0;pm). Thus, e=1 if an only if
z ¸ ¹ z(x;0;pm), irrespective of whether y = 1 or y = 0. Thus, e=1 if an only if ^ µ(x;0;z) ¸
0. Let b(x) = · µ(x; ¹ z(x;0;pm)) ¡ ^ µ(x;0; ¹ z(x;0;pm)). Then, e = 1 , · µ(x;z) ¸ b(x).
As the rule e = 1 , · µ(x;z) ¸ 0, is optimal by de¯ntion within the set of rules which
use only x and z, it follows that ¹ wS(¹ p) < ¹ wP.
Proof of Proposition 4: Given Lemma 6 and the ¯xed-point theorem, it is su±-
cient to prove the two following claims:
1. ¹ wS(p
¤) is strictly decreasing and continuous in p
¤;
2. Let ¹ wS(pm) = limp¤!p+
m ¹ wS(p¤). Then, ¹ wS(pm) > ¹ wP.
To prove Claim 1, recall (3) and notice that wS(1;1;p





¤) is constant in p
¤. Suppose
y1 = 1: then the expected voter welfare is ¹ wS(p
¤jy1 = 1) ´ maxfwS(1;1;p
¤);wS(0;1;p
¤)g,
which is strictly decreasing in p
¤. Suppose y1 = 0: then the expected voter welfare is
¹ wS(p
¤jy1 = 0) ´ maxfwS(1;0;p
¤);wS(0;1;p
¤)g, which is constant in p
¤. As
¹ wS(p
¤) = Pr(y1 = 1) ¹ wS(p
¤jy1 = 1) + Pr(y1 = 0)¹ wS(p
¤jy1 = 0)
and the event y1 = 1 has positive probability which does not depend on p
¤, the claim is
proven.
To prove Claim 2, suppose that, if p
¤ ! p
+
m. Then, under the separating equilibrium,
when y = 1, p1 ! p




µ1 if e = 1
0 if e = 2
which is identical to the ex post welfare under the pooling equilibrium. However, under
the separating equilibrium voters know x, y, and z while under a pooling equilibrium
voters only know x and z. Because y is informative,
Eµ[ max
e2f1;2g
E(w(e;pm)jx;y;z)] > Eµ[ max
e2f1;2g
E(w(e;pm)jx;z)]
which proves Claim 2.
Statement and Proof of Lemma 10 The following technical result is useful:

















for any y 2 ~ (Y ) and any µ0;µ00 2 £ (and similarly for z). Also, it follows immediately
from Assumption 1 that gy and gz satisfy the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property with



















By recalling Part (ii) of Assumption 4, applying (8), and switching µ1 with µ2, we have
¡^ µ(¡y;¡z) = ^ µ(y;z). 2
Proof of Lemma 7: It is easy to see that ¦all(p) > ¦H(p) > ¦M(p) > ¦L(p) and
that ¦all(p) ¡ ¦M(p) > ¦all(p) ¡ ¦H(p). Also, ¦H(p) + ¦L(p) > ¦all(p), which implies
¦L(p) > ®(p
¤). If y = 0, ¦all(p) ¡ 2®(p) > ¦M(p) ¡ ®(p) > 0: G is willing to make an
o®er to both candidates. If y 6= 0, ¦all(p) ¡ 2®(p) = ¦H(p) ¡ ®(p) > 0 and G is exactly
indi®erent between making an o®er to H only or to both H and L.






for any p0, p00 and y. Then, (5) is equivalent to z(1;p¤;pm) ¸ 0. Both (5) and (4) are
satis¯ed if and only if z(1;p
¤;pm) ¸ 0, which is true if p
¤ · p.
Proof of Proposition 5: Proof of (i): Beliefs are consistent with (iii) and (iv).
Proof of (ii): Lemma 1. Proof of (iii): Lemma 7. Proof of (iv): There are two cases:
j = H or j = M. By (i) and Lemma 8, given the strategy of ¡j, the strategy of j is
optimal in both cases.












Thus, the net expected payo® is equal in both cases (another useful consequence of As-
sumption 4). Let
p
max = argmaxp2¦H(p) ¡ ¦all(p)
subject to p
max · p. Analogously to Lemma 5, G sets p
¤ = p
max.
35Proof of Proposition 6: Under a ban on split contributions, the No-Split-Contribution
Equilibrium (NSCE) of Proposition 11 in Section 7.3 will still be a sequential equilibrium
of Game 2. Let us compare SCE with NSCE. If y 6= 0, the outcome for voters is identical
in both equilibria. If y = 0, 1 is elected in one equilibrium if and only he is elected in the
other (when z > 0) but in the SCE p1 = p2 = p while in the NSCE p1 = p2 = pm. Thus,
if y = 0, the voter welfare is strictly higher under NSCE. Therefore, the ex-ante welfare
(before y is realized) is higher in NSCE than in SCE.
Proof of Proposition 7: Recall that p1 is unobserved and Candidate 1 cares
about policy only in¯nitesimally. Then, if he accepts an o®er aoffer1, he will accept
it independently of p
¤. Thus G will always ask for her preferred policy: p
¤ = pg. In
equilibrium voters know that p¤ = pg. Thus, if they observe aoffer1 > 0, they infer p1 =
pG. If A
¤
1 > ¦H(pg), the incentive-compatibility condition is satis¯ed. The Participation
constraint is satis¯ed if and only if pg · ¹ p. Thus, Candidate 1 accepts G's o®er if and only
if pg · ¹ p. Thus, if pg > ¹ p, a separating equilibrium cannot exist. If pg · ¹ p, the existence
of a separating equilibrium is proven analogously to Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 9: In a separating equilibrium, the following constraints
must be satis¯ed:
1. PC for 1: p
¤ · ¹ p;
2. ICC for G: A
¤ ¸ ¦L(pg) (because ¦L(pg) is the maximum G is willing to o®er,
under any p
¤, if y1 = 0.
3. PC for G: ¦H(p
¤) ¸ A
¤.
Considering the last two constraints, Candidate 1 minimizes p
¤ by choosing p
¤ = P where
P is the lowest solution to ¦H(P) = ¦L(pg). The PC for 1 is satis¯ed if and only if P · ¹ p.
If P > ¹ p, the PC for 1 and the ICC cannot be both satis¯ed and a separating equilibrium
does not exist.
7.2 Example for Remark 2
Let us assume that u(¢) = 1
¸j¢j where ¸ > 0. Thus, u(pi ¡pe) is decreasing at a constant
rate up to pi and increasing at a constant rate after pi. Of course, the same applies to
¹u(pg ¡ pe). Let us also assume that pm = 0.
Also, µ1 2 f0;1g with Pr(µ1 = 0) = Pr(µ1 = 0); X = [0;1] and Z 2 [0;1] with
fx(x1jµ) =
½
2x if µ1 = 1




2z if µ1 = 1
2(1 ¡ z1) if µ1 = 0
Instead of the usual µ2 = 0, let µ2 = 1
2.




2[1 + ½(2y1 ¡ 1)] if µ1 = 1
1
2[1 ¡ ½(2y1 ¡ 1)] if µ1 = 0
30Instead, one could assume µ2 = 0 and µ1 2 f¡0:5;0:5g. The results would not change.
36where ½ 2 (0;1) represents the precision of y1. Then,
^ µ(x1;y1;z1) = Pr(µ1 = 1jx1;y1;z1)
=
fx(x1jµ1 = 1)fy(y1jµ1 = 1)fz(z1jµ1 = 1)
fx(x1jµ1 = 0)fy(y1jµ1 = 0)fz(z1jµ1 = 0) + fx(x1jµ1 = 1)fy(y1jµ1 = 1)fz(z1jµ1 = 1)
=
x1z1[1 + ½(2y1 ¡ 1)]
(1 ¡ x1)(1 ¡ z1)[1 ¡ ½(2y1 ¡ 1)] + x1z1[1 + ½(2y1 ¡ 1)]




fz(z1jµ1 = 1)Pr(µ1 = 1jx1;y1) +
1
2
fz(z1jµ1 = 0)Pr(µ1 = 0jx1;y1)
=
z1x1[1 + ½(2y1 ¡ 1)] + (1 ¡ z1)(1 ¡ x1)[1 ¡ ½(2y1 ¡ 1)







2(1 ¡ x1)z1[1 ¡ ½(2y1 ¡ 1)] + z
2
1(2x1 ¡ 1¡ ½ + 2y1½
1+ ½ ¡ 2x1½ ¡ 2y1½ + 4x1y1½
Recall that ¹ z(x1;y1;p









¡1+ x1 ¡ 2p
¤¸ + 2p
¤x1¸ + ½ ¡ x1½ + 2p
¤¸½ ¡ 2p
¤x1¸½
¡1 ¡ 2p¤¸ + 4p¤x1¸ + ½ ¡ 2x1½ + 2p¤¸½
(9)
Let ¹ p be the unique p
¤ that solves
¹ z(x1;1;p





(the fact ¹ p is independent of x1 is a feature of this example, but is not true in general).
By (7),
¦y(p
¤) = (1¡ ¡(¹ z(x;1;p







1(4(p¤)2¸2 ¡ 1)¹½(½2 ¡ 1)
[¡1 + (1 ¡ 2x1)2½2][¡1 + ½ ¡ 2x1½ ¡ 2x1½ + 2½¸(2x1 ¡ 1 + ½)]2
pmax cannot be found analytically, but, given some parameter values, it can be com-
puted. For instance, let us assume that pg = 1, ¸ = 1, and ¹ = 1. Suppose ½ = 0:3.
Then,
¹ p = 0:275
pmax = 0:326
37Suppose instead that ½ = 0:5. Then,
¹ p = 0:4
pmax = 0:358
Thus, we have shown that both the case ¹ p > pmax and the case ¹ p < pmax are possible.
7.3 No-Split-Contribution Equilibrium
The electoral game of Section 4 has another separating equilibrium besides the one char-
acterized in Proposition 5:






^ µ(1;z) if A1 ¸ ¦M(p
¤) and A2 < ¦M(p
¤)
^ µ(0;z) = · µ(z) if max(A1;A2) < ¦M(p
¤) or min(A1;A2 ¸ ¦M(p
¤)
^ µ(¡1;z) if A1 < ¦M(p
¤) and A2 ¸ ¦M(p
¤)
(ii) Voters' choice: ei = 1 if and only if ~ µ ¡ u(pi ¡ p1) ¡ u(pi ¡ p2) > 0. 1 is elected if
and only if ~ µ ¡ u(pm ¡ p1) ¡ u(pm ¡ p2) > 0
(iii) Group's o®er: For y 2 f¡1;0;1g, p
¤ = min(pmax;p).

















(iv) Candidates' acceptance: for j = 1;2, Candidate j accepts A
¤





¤ · P. If j rejects, pj = pm.
Which of the two separating equilibria is more plausible? Let us adapt to our prob-
lem the belief-based re¯nement due to Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite [23].
Consider a signaling game with a Sender with two types and a Receiver. The framework
of Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite is di®ernt from this framework. They con-
sider a signaling game with one Sender and one Receiver. In the present game, the role
of the Sender is exercised by G and by the candidates. Thus, the de¯nition of Mailath,
Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite needs to be adapted as follows
De¯nition 1 Suppose E1 and E2 are two sequential equilibria of Game 2. It is said that
E1 defeats E2 if the expected payo® for G given y is strictly higher under E1 than under
E2.
There are two `types' of G, the one with y = 0 and the one with y 6= 0. If both types
are strictly better o® under a Split-Contribution Equilibrium, they it is hard to see why
G (the sender) should play the No-Split-Contribution Equilibrium. Voters and candidates
(the receivers) should expect groups to play the Split-Contribution Equilibrium and should
select their strategies accordingly.
38Proposition 12 The Split-Contribution Equilibrium defeats the No-Split-Contribution
Equilibrium.
Proof: The expected payo® of G under NSCE is 0 if y = 0 and ¦H ¡¦M if y 6= 0. The
expected payo® under SCE is 2¦H¡¦all for any y (see Subsection 4.2.3). ¦M+¦M > ¦all
implies ¦H + ¦M > ¦all, and thus ¦H ¡ ¦M < 2¦H ¡ ¦all. The expected payo® for G
given y is strictly higher under SCE than under NSCE. 2
G always prefers the Split-Contribution Equilibrium. If voters and candidates know
that, they should anticipate that G will play according to the Split-Contribution Equilib-
rium. Then the No-Split-Contribution Equilibrium is unlikely to arise.
7.4 Perfectly Informative y1.
In this model y1 is not completely informative. Suppose on the contrary that y1 were
perfectly informative (or that G observes µ1 as in Gerber [12]). For instance: µ1 2 f0;1g
and y1 = µj. Then, ^ µ(x1;y1;z1) = yj and, from (1), one can see that ¦H(p) = ¦L(p).
There would exist a separating equilibrium.
31 However, it would be quite arbitrary. In




¤), so that G would be indi®erent between
contributing and not contributing both when she has observed y1 = 0 and when she has
observed y1 = 1.
To illustrate the brittleness of such a separating equilibrium, assume that G must pay
an in¯nitesimal amount ² to observe y1. Because ² is a sunk cost, it does not in°uence
¦y(p
¤). G's net expected payo® would be r(p
¤) ´ [¦H(p
¤) ¡ ¦L(p
¤)]Pr(y1 = 1) ¡ ². If
Y1 is perfectly informative, ¦H(p
¤) = ¦L(p
¤) and r(p
¤) = ¡². G would not observe y1




¤) > 0, so that G would pay ² to observe y1.
31I thank Randolph Sloof for pointing out the existence of a separating equilibrium in
this case.
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